North Korea embarks on a new round of reconciliation

The seesawing relationship between North Korea and the rest of the world has begun to move to towards détente after a prolonged period of heightened tensions. The two Koreas have agreed to resume the programme of reuniting families divided by the 1953 War, and officials now talk of opening to border to Southern tourists. Pyongyang has even invited a special US envy to discuss its nuclear programme.

But seasoned Northern Korean watchers will treat these latest developments with scepticism. The foreign policy of the North is a delicate balance of shocking denouncements and concessionary tokens entreating aid - conducted in the context of a gradual proliferation of nuclear weapons.

On the annual August military exercises between South Korean and the US, the DPRK regime released the following official statements:

“The U.S. and the south Korean puppet warmongers claimed that the war manoeuvres are "ordinary drills for defence" and they "do not involve field mobile exercises" but this is nothing but sheer sophism intended to cover up the aggressive nature and the ulterior aim sought by them through this sabre rattling.”

And then:

“This story may fool those imbeciles who know nothing about politics and military affairs or naive children who have just started learning the four rules of arithmetic.”

Their approach to diplomacy appears to work on a cyclical basis of blowing hot and cold in reiterated rounds of reconciliation and rows. North Korea joined the Six Party talks to much fanfare, before eventually flouncing from the negotiation table. Official talks with Southern representatives and even Seoul’s president have been held, to no ostensive effect. The DPRK has ratified international treaties, suggesting a movement towards diplomatic normality, only to abrogate later from their obligations.

The belligerence and brinkmanship of the North is difficult, but not impossible to contain. Since the 1953 Armistice, Northern aggressors have penetrated the 38th Parallel on 24 recorded occasions. In October 1968, over 100 commandos crossed the Demilitarised Zone with the objective of assassinating the Southern President. To date, four tunnels have been detected under the border. Fortunately none of these incursions led to war.

Recently, after apparently abandoning its policy of kidnapping Japanese citizens, Pyongyang imprisoned two American journalists for “producing and broadcasting a documentary slandering the DPRK” and sentenced them to 12 years hard labour. The journalists were only recovered when Pyongyang insisted that Bill Clinton should lead a personal mission apologising for their crimes.

The Great Powers dealing with the hermit regime, appear to have successfully contained the threat, but have calculated, in the long term, the disparity between it and its neighbours, burgeoning internal unrest of its staved population and possibly the departure of the aging Kim Jong Il from office will inevitably lead to political collapse.

Yet, the DPRK has survived 20 years without the buttressing support of Soviet Russia, and for the last 10 years with decreasing Chinese assistance by specialising its economy to function on minimal resources. The regime has already managed the transition from one god-like leader to another, and it appears to be beginning the process of regime change again. There are no external signs that these will led to an improved situation.

It would be prudent to resist the temptation of optimism. It would be misguided to interpret these new measures as the first steps in the path towards normalisation, but we might hope that a prolonged period of relatively friendly relations may push the centre of DPRK relations cycle towards a less threatening centre.